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ABSTRACT
This paper presents Dilithium, a lattice-based signature scheme
that is part of the CRYSTALS (Cryptographic Suite for Algebraic
Lattices) package that will be submitted to the NIST call for post-
quantum standards. The scheme is designed to be simple to securely
implement against side-channel attacks and to have comparable
efficiency to the currently best lattice-based signature schemes. Our
implementation results show that Dilithium is competitive with
lattice schemes of the same security level and outperforms digital
signature schemes based on other post-quantum assumptions.
1 INTRODUCTION
Cryptography based on the hardness of lattice problems is seen as
a very promising potential replacement of classical cryptography
after the eventual emergence of quantum computing. In this paper,
we describe a signature scheme that will be submitted as a candidate
to the NIST call for new standards for digital signature, encryption,
and key establishment protocols [19].
The goal for our design is to obtain a scheme that is simple to im-
plement, efficient to run, and that is secure against lattice reduction
attacks based on the same conservative parameter estimations as
in [3]. The currently most efficient lattice-based scheme, BLISS [25],
is based on the hardness of (a variant of) the NTRU problem and cru-
cially uses discrete Gaussian sampling and high-precision rejection
sampling to create compact signatures.
It has been recently shown (e.g., [17, 47]) that Gaussian sampling
can create a lot of potential side-channel vulnerabilities that result
in complete leakage of the secret key. While it is almost certainly
possible to create good implementations which protect against
(some) side-channel attacks (e.g., preventing timing attacks can be
done following the approach in [43]), the intricacies involved make
it an area in which one can very easily make mistakes. Since the
goal is to create a scheme that is to be widely deployed, it would be
highly desirable to have a scheme whose efficiency is comparable
to that of BLISS, yet does not require Gaussian sampling.
It has also been shown that basing the hardness of cryptographic
schemes on the NTRU problem (i.e., breaking the scheme is equiva-
lent to finding a short vector in the NTRU lattice) may be weaker
than expected, at least for large parameters [33].While these attacks
do not currently affect the parameters that are used in encryption
and signature schemes, it does cause some concern that the pro-
blems may be somewhat easier than previously thought. Avoiding
using the assumption that it is hard finding short vectors in the
NTRU lattice is also therefore somewhat desirable if the efficiency
penalty for doing so is not too high.
1.1 Our Proposal
Our scheme proposal, named Dilithium, is based on, and is an im-
provement of, the designs from [30] and [7]. The only sampling that
is required in the scheme is uniform over some bounded domain
and the rejection sampling part simply checks whether the indivi-
dual coefficients of the potential signature are all smaller than a
certain bound. The main improvement of Dilithium over [7, 30] is
that the public key size is shrunk by more than a factor 2. We are
able to do this by adapting the idea from [30] for producing “hints”
about the carries caused by small summands (we in fact greatly
simplify and improve the hint-generation from [30]). In [30], the
idea for using “hints” was applied only to reduce the size of the
signature, but we show that it can be used fairly effectively to also
reduce the size of the public key.
While [7] was an improvement over [30] in that it removed
the need for “hints” and therefore reduced the signature size by
about 10%, reintroducing the hints allows us to significantly decre-
ase the public key size at the expense of increasing the signature
length by less than 5%. Since in many applications, the total sum
of the public key size and the signature length is important, we
believe that this is a very good trade-off. In fact, the total size of
the public key plus signature size is only somewhat larger than
that of BLISS for similar security levels. The parameter sizes for
our signature scheme are presented in Table 1.
If instantiated so as to have similar security, the signature scheme
BLISSwould need to be implemented over a ring of dimension about
double as what was used in [25], thus Zq [X ]/(X 1024+1). We would
estimate that BLISS would have a public key and signature sizes
of roughly 2KB and 1.5KB, respectively. The reason that the BLISS
public key size would be larger than in our current construction, is
because we do not see a way in which it can be compressed.
Our scheme was implemented on an Intel Core-i7 4770k (Has-
well) processor and all the results are provided in Table 1. Furt-
her information and comparisons to schemes based on other post-
quantum assumptions are detailed in Section 6.
We also present a variant of Dilithium that requires sampling
from a discrete Gaussian distribution.Wewill refer to this variant as
Dilithium-G. This scheme has slightly better parameters and slightly
more security for the recommended parameter sizes. We designed
Dilithium-G so that it works over the same ring as Dilithium. The
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importance of this is that, while the signing algorithms of the two
schemes are quite different, the verification algorithm is very similar
and does not require any sampling. Thus it is possible to envision a
scenario in which the signers could choose which signature to use
because the verifiers would be able to verify signatures created by
either signing algorithm. In particular, signers who are sure that
their schemes would not be affected by side-channel attacks could
use Dilithium-G, while those who create signatures in more hostile
environments would use Dilithium.
1.2 Design Considerations
Our scheme, as well as all the ones mentioned above, are built
via the “Fiat-Shamir with Aborts” framework [36] as illustrated in
Fig. 1. The security of schemes built in this manner is based on the
hardness of finding short vectors in lattices over the ring Rq . Past
works have instantiated the scheme in one of two ways. Either they
set the parameters k = ℓ = 1 and Rq = Zq [X ]/(Xn + 1) or they set
k, ℓ > 1 and Rq = Zq . The former choice results in a scheme based
on the hardness of the Ring-LWE and Ring-SIS problems (or, in the
case of BLISS, the NTRU problem). The latter choice of parameters
makes the scheme based on the LWE / SIS problem. The general
case where k, ℓ ≥ 1 and R = Zq [X ]/(Xn + 1) results in a scheme
based on the Module-LWE / Module-SIS problem.
The main structural requirement that affects the parameter sizes
is that the challenge c must have small norm and come from the
ring Rq . Thus if Rq is a ring that does not have many elements of
small norm (like Zq ), one will either have large signatures due to
the fact that c will be extremely large, or will choose a c from a
smaller domain but need to repeat the scheme in parallel to decrease
the soundness error, which will also serve to increase the signature
size.1
The efficacy of lattice reduction attacks on the scheme is based on
the products kn and ℓn, where n is the degree of the ring Rq . Thus
based on the above, it is most efficient to set k, ℓ = 1 and choose a
large ring Rq . Our approach is to fix the ring Rq = Zq [X ]/(X 256+1)
and vary k, ℓ. For the size of the challenge space, this is a little sub-
optimal. If, for example, we would take k, ℓ = 4 , then this is the
same as using k, ℓ = 1 and a ring of dimension 1024. In a ring of
dimension 1024, one could have a subset of size 2256 all of whose
elements have ℓ2 norm less than 6. In a 256-dimensional ring, the
ℓ2 norm would be a little less than 8. Because the two numbers are
rather close, this has a rather small influence on the parameters,
and we find that the advantages of using a fixed ring outweighs
this disadvantage.
A major advantage of choosing an A ∈ Rk×ℓq is the flexibility of
the scheme. A large portion of the running time of the signing and
the verification algorithms is performed doing multiplications in
the ring Zq [X ]/(X 256 + 1). Thus optimizing this part is crucial to
getting the scheme to be efficient. Because the ring is exactly the
same for every k, ℓ, one can easily re-use the critical parts of the
implementation for schemes of various security levels. If one were
to base the schemes on Ring-LWE / Ring-SIS, however, one would
need to change rings in order to change security, which would
1There is also the option of defining the secret key to be a matrix rather than a vector,
and the challenge c to be a vector [37]. This reduces the signature size, but increases
the size of the secret and public keys.
Key Generation:
1: A← Rk×ℓq
2: s1 ← Sℓ , s2 ← Sk
3: t B As1 + s2 mod q.
4: Public Key B (A, t)
5: Secret Key B (s1, s2)
Sign(µ, ρ, s1, s2, t):
1: y1 ← Y ℓ , y2 ← Yk
2: w B Ay1 + y2 mod q
3: c B H(A, t,w, µ)
4: z1 B y1 + cs1, z2 B y2 + cs2
5: Run RejectionSample(z1, z2, cs1, cs2), and goto 1 if it rejects
6: output (z1, z2, c)
Verify(µ, (z1, z2, c),A, t):
1: w B Az1 + z2 − ct mod q
2: ACCEPT if c = H(A, t,w, µ), and ∥(z1, z2)∥ is small.
Figure 1: Fiat-Shamir with Aborts Framework. The sets S
and Y are subsets of R with small coefficients. H is a crypto-
graphic hash function outputting to a low-norm subset of R
of size at least 2256. The RejectionSample procedure in the
signing algorithm makes the signature part (z1, z2) indepen-
dent of the secret key.
require the re-implementation of all the routines. This could be
especially costly in hardware. By keeping the ring constant and
only varying the parameters k and ℓ, on the other hand, would
make varying the security (whether due to novel cryptanalysis
or for different application requirements) extremely simple. Being
able to easily vary the security could also make it easier to adopt
the scheme prior to the standardization process. Other advantages
include the fact that the scheme has less algebraic structure, thus
reducing the available practical attack avenues, as well as the fact
that one can vary the parameters k and ℓ independently, which
results in schemes that are less wasteful in setting the dimensions.
1.3 Security and Quantum Security
Our schemes are proven secure in the random oracle model, but
we do not have a security proof in the quantum random oracle
model. This is the same state of affairs as for every other somewhat
efficient scheme using the Fiat-Shamir framework. It is possible to
modify the parameters of our scheme to enable a security proof in
the quantum random oracle model as done in [2] using the analy-
sis from [1] for the scheme in [7], but this would increase certain
parameter sizes by at least an order of magnitude. A different ap-
proach to get a lattice-based scheme secure in the quantum random
oracle model would be to use the full-domain-hash design strategy
as in [28]. A particularly efficient instantiation of the preceding
scheme using NTRU lattices was given in [26]. The main problem
is that to get small signatures would require sampling from a high-
precision discrete Gaussian distribution with varying centers. This
is an even more computationally intensive and intricate operation
than the discrete Gaussian sampling required for BLISS. There are
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work-arounds to not use the Gaussian distribution [41], but the
result ends up significantly increasing the parameter sizes. One
could also consider using lattice-based schemes that do not use any
random oracles (e.g. [16, 27]), but those are even less efficient.
The lack of a security proof for our scheme in the quantum
random oracle model is partially due to the same principle as why
it is not possible to prove many classically-secure computationally-
binding commitment schemes secure against a quantum adversary
(see for example the discussion in [24]). In particular, we do not
know how to discard the scenario in which the adversary produces
a commitment together with some quantum state, which he can
use to open the commitment to any value. Since the quantum state
has been measured during the opening, the adversary cannot be
asked to open the commitment to a second value and thus pro-
duce a collision, thus solving a presumably-hard problem upon
which we wish to base the hardness of the commitment scheme. In
short, a quantum adversary may theoretically be able to open the
commitment only once, but do it to any value.
In Fiat-Shamir signatures, the first step of the protocol can be
thought of as the commitment, the signature is the opening of a
commitment, and the challenge is the committed message. Thus
we cannot formally dismiss the scenario in which the adversary is
able to come up with a commitment that he can open (i.e., sign) for
a random message (the challenge). Nevertheless, as far as we know,
there are no “natural” candidates of classically-secure commitment
schemes that can be broken in this manner by a quantum adversary.
Furthermore, Fiat-Shamir schemes that correspond to perfectly-
binding commitment schemes have been shown to be secure in
the quantum random oracle model [51], and the only examples
of insecure Fiat-Shamir schemes are quite unnatural [4], which
is somewhat similar to the status of the Fiat-Shamir heuristic in
the classical world – it is known that insecure instances exist, but
these instances are specifically tailored to be insecure [13, 29]. It is
therefore also a reasonable assumption that “natural” Fiat-Shamir
signatures that are secure in the random oracle model, and use
“quantum-secure” cryptographic hash functions,2 are also secure
when the adversary has quantum access to the cryptographic hash
function. Finding a proof for this conjecture, or refuting it with a
counter-example, remains a major open problem.
2 PRELIMINARIES
For a set S , we write s ← S to denote that s is chosen uniformly at
random from S . If S is a probability distribution, then this denotes
that s is chosen according to the distribution S .
All our algorithms are probabilistic. Ifb is a string, then a ← A(b)
denotes the output of algorithm A when run on input b; if A is
deterministic, then a is a fixed value and we write a B A(b).
2Proving security of Fiat-Shamir protocols based on the hardness of some problem
P involves proving a statement of the form “If the Adversary succeeds, then either
problem P is easy or finding a 2nd pre-image in the cryptographic hash function H is
easy.” Thus we will be assuming that the H function used in the Fiat-Shamir signature
is 2nd pre-image-resistant against quantum algorithms. This requires doubling the
output range of a “classically-secure” cryptographic hash function (e.g. SHA-3) to
protect against Grover’s algorithm.
2.1 Cryptographic Definitions
A signature scheme SIG = (KeyGen, Sign,Verify) is a triple of pro-
babilistic polynomial-time algorithms together with a message
space M. The key-generation algorithm KeyGen returns a pair
(pk, sk) consisting of a public key and a secret key. The signing
algorithm Sign takes a secret key sk and a messagem ∈ M to pro-
duce a signature Σ. Finally, the deterministic verification algorithm
Verify takes a public key pk, a messagem ∈ M and a signature Σ,
and outputs either 0 (reject) or 1 (accept). We say that SIG is correct
if for all messagem ∈ M and all (pk, sk) ← KeyGen(), we have
Verify(pk,m, Sign(sk,m)) = 1.
We recall the standard security notion for signature of strong ex-
istential unforgeability under chosen-message attacks (seu-CMA).
The advantage of an adversary A is defined as AdvcmaSIG (A) =
Pr
b = 1 :
(sk, pk) ← KeyGen();
(m⋆, Σ⋆) ← ASign(·)(pk);
b B Verify(pk,m⋆, Σ⋆)
 ,
where the signing oracle is defined as Sign(·) B Sign(sk, ·). We
further require that (m⋆, Σ⋆) is none of the input-output pairs A
obtained through the Sign(·) queries. The scheme SIG is said to be
(t ,qS , ϵ) seu-CMA secure if no adversary running in time at most t
and making at most qS queries to the signing oracle has advantage
AdvcmaSIG (A) greater than ϵ .
In the random oracle model [9], the adversary A is additionally
given access to a random oracle H(·) that it can query up to qH
times.
2.2 Rings and Distributions
We let R and Rq respectively denote the rings Z[X ]/(Xn + 1) and
Zq [X ]/(Xn + 1), for q an integer. Throughout this paper, the value
ofnwill always be 256 andqwill be the prime 8380417 = 223−213+1.
Regular font letters denote elements in R or Rq (which includes
elements in Z and Zq ) and bold lower-case letters represent column
vectors with coefficients in R or Rq . By default, all vectors will be
column vectors. Bold upper-case letters are matrices. For a vector v,
we denote by vT its transpose.
Modular reductions. For an even (resp. odd) positive integer α ,
we define r ′ = r mod± α to be the unique element r ′ in the range
−α2 < r ′ ≤ α2 (resp. −α−12 ≤ r ′ ≤ α−12 ) such that r ′ = r mod α .
We will sometimes refer to this as a centered reduction modulo q.
For any positive integer α , we define r ′ = r mod+α to be the unique
element r ′ in the range 0 ≤ r ′ < α such that r ′ = r mod α . When
the exact representation is not important, we simply write r mod α .
Sizes of elements. For an element w ∈ Zq , we write ∥w ∥∞ to
mean |w mod± q |. We now define the ℓ∞ and ℓ2 norms for w =
w0 +w1X + . . . +wn−1Xn−1 ∈ R:
∥w ∥∞ = max
i
∥wi ∥∞, ∥w ∥ =
√
∥w0∥2∞ + . . . + ∥wn−1∥2∞.
Similarly, for w = (w1, . . . ,wk ) ∈ Rk , we define
∥w∥∞ = max
i
∥wi ∥∞, ∥w∥ =
√
∥w1∥2 + . . . + ∥wk ∥2.
We will write Sη to denote all elementsw ∈ R such that ∥w ∥∞ ≤ η.
3
Extendable output function. Suppose that Sam is an extendable
output function, that is a function on bit strings in which the out-
put can be extended to any desired length. If we would like Sam
to take as input x and then produce a value y that is distributed
according to distribution S (or uniformly over a set S), we write
y ∼ S B Sam(x). It is important to note that this procedure is com-
pletely deterministic: a given x will always produce the same y. For
simplicity we assume that the output distribution of Sam is perfect,
whereas in practice Sam will be implemented using random ora-
cles and produce an output that is statistically close to the perfect
distribution.
Hashing. Let Bh denote the set of elements of R that have h
coefficients that are either −1 or 1 and the rest are 0. We have
|Bh | = 2h ·
(n
h
)
.
For our signature scheme, we will need a cryptographic hash
function that hashes onto B60 (which has more than 2256 elements).
The algorithm we will use to create a random element in B60 is
sometimes referred to as an “inside-out” version of the Fisher-Yates
shuffle.3
Algorithm 1 Create a random 256-element array with 60 ±1’s and
196 0′s
1: Initialize c = c0c1 . . . c255 = 00 . . . 0
2: for i := 196 to 255 do
3: j ← {0, 1, . . . , i}
4: s ← {0, 1}
5: ci := c j
6: c j := (−1)s
7: end for
8: return c
Therefore to create a function H : {0, 1}∗ → B60, one would
use the XOF Sam to expand the input to produce the randomness
needed by Algorithm 1 – that is produce 60 j’s, where ji is uniformly
random between 0 and i , and 60 bits for the s .
2.3 Module-LWE and Module-SIS
Let ℓ be a positive integer parameter. The hard problems under-
lying the security of our schemes are Module-LWE and Module-SIS,
which were studied in [35], and are a generalization of the Ring-
LWE [40] and Ring-SIS problems [38, 46].
Module-LWE distribution. The Module-LWE distribution is the
distribution on Rkq × Rq induced by pairs (ai ,bi ) where ai ← Rℓq is
uniform and b = aTi s + ei with s← Sℓη common to all samples and
ei ← Sη fresh for every sample.
Module-LWE.Module-LWE consists in recovering s from polyno-
mially many samples chosen from the Module-LWE distribution.
More precisely, for an algorithm A, we define Advmlwek, ℓ,η (A) =
Pr
[
x = s : A← R
k×ℓ
q ; (s, e) ← Sℓη × Skη ;
b← As + e; x← A(A, b);
]
.
3Normally, the algorithm should begin at i = 0, but since there are 196 0’s, the first
195 iterations would just be setting components of c to 0.
We say that the (t , ϵ)Module-LWEk, ℓ,η hardness assumption holds
if no algorithm A running in time at most t has an advantage greater
than ϵ .
(Inhomogeneous) Module-SIS. The Inhomogeneous Module-SIS
problem consists in finding a pre-image x satisfying [ A | I ] · x = t,
where t← Rkq , A← Rk×ℓq and I is the k × k identity matrix.4 More
precisely, for an algorithm A, we define Advmsisk,k+ℓ,β (A) =
Pr
b = 1 :
A← Rk×ℓq ;
t← Rkq ;
x← A(A);
b B (x ∈ Rk+ℓ) ∧ ([ A | I ] · x = t) ∧ (∥x∥ ≤ β)
 .
We say that the (t , ϵ)Module-SISk,k+ℓ,β hardness assumption holds
if no algorithm A running in time at most t has an advantage greater
than ϵ . We define Module-SIS∞k,k+ℓ,β as the direct adaptation to
the infinity norm. The homogeneous version of the Module-SIS
problem is defined with the target t = 0 and the solution x = 0
being disallowed.
3 ROUNDING ALGORITHMS
In this section, we introduce the rounding algorithms that we will
use to compress the public key and signature in Dilithium.
3.1 High-order and Low-order Bits
We will break up elements in Zq into their “high-order” bits and
“low-order” bits in two ways. The first algorithm Power2Roundq
is the straightforward bit-wise way to break up an element r =
r1 · 2d + r0 where r0 = r mod± 2d and r1 = (r − r0)/2d , and is
presented in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Power2Roundq (r ,d)
1: r B r mod+ q
2: r0 B r mod± 2d
3: return (r − r0)/2d
Notice that if we choose the representatives of r1 to be non-
negative integers between 0 and ⌊q/2d ⌋, then the distance (mo-
dulo q) between any two r1 · 2d and r ′1 · 2d is usually ≥ 2d , except
for the border case. In particular, the distance modulo q between
⌊q/2d ⌋ · 2d and 0 could be very small. For our applications, we
would like to have a rounding procedure that keeps this distance
bounded from below by ≈ 2d ; this will allow us to have 1-bit hints
for the uniform digital signature scheme and slightly decrease the
hint size for the Gaussian one.
We accomplish this by selecting an α that is a divisor of q−1 and
write r = r1 · α + r0 in the same way as before. For the sake of sim-
plicity, we assume that α is even (which is possible, as q is odd). The
possible r1 ·α ’s are now {0,α , 2α , . . . ,q − 1}. Note that the distance
between q− 1 and 0 is 1, and so we remove q− 1 from the set of pos-
sible r1 · α ’s, and simply round the corresponding r ’s to 0. Because
q−1 and 0 differ by 1, all this does is possibly increase themagnitude
4This is often referred to as the “Hermite Normal Form” of the problem. It is equivalent
to the Module-SIS problem where the matrix [ A | I ] is replaced by a completely
random matrix A′ ← Rk×(k+ℓ)q .
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of the remainder r0 by 1. This procedure is called Decomposeq and
is presented in Algorithm 3. For notational convenience, we also
define HighBitsq and LowBitsq routines that simply extract r1 and
r0, respectively, from the output of Decomposeq ; cf. Algorithms 4
and 5.
Algorithm 3 Decomposeq (r ,α)
1: r B r mod+ q
2: r0 B r mod± α
3: if r − r0 = q − 1 then
4: r1 B 0
5: r0 B r0 − 1
6: else
7: r1 B (r − r0)/α
8: end if
9: return (r1, r0)
Algorithm 4 HighBitsq (r ,α)
1: (r1, r0) := Decomposeq (r ,α)
2: return r1
Algorithm 5 LowBitsq (r ,α)
1: (r1, r0) := Decomposeq (r ,α)
2: return r0
Finally, when these algorithms are called with r ∈ Rq or r ∈ Rkq ,
the rounding procedure is applied to each coefficient individually.
3.2 Producing “Hints” for Dilithium
Let q and α be positive integers with q > 2α and q ≡ 1 (mod α)
(and α even). Given r , z ∈ Zq with ∥z∥∞ ≤ α/2, we would like
to produce a 1-bit hint y, such that one can derive HighBitsq (r +
z,α) from r ,q,α and y. We propose a procedure MakeHintq in
Algorithm 6 to produce such a hint, and a procedure UseHintq in
Algorithm 7 that shows how to use the hint y to recover the higher
order bits of r + z. When these algorithms are called with r , z ∈ Rq
or r, z ∈ Rkq , the rounding procedure is applied to each coefficient
individually.
Algorithm 6MakeHintq (z, r ,α)
1: r1 := HighBitsq (r ,α)
2: v1 := HighBitsq (r + z,α)
3: if r1 = v1 then
4: return 0
5: else
6: return 1
7: end if
Lemma 3.1. Let r , z ∈ Zq with ∥z∥∞ ≤ α/2. Then
UseHintq
(
MakeHintq (z, r ,α), r ,α
)
= HighBitsq (r + z,α).
Algorithm 7 UseHintq (y, r ,α)
1: m B (q − 1)/α
2: (r1, r0) := Decomposeq (r ,α)
3: if y = 1 and r0 > 0 then
4: return (r1 + 1) mod+m
5: else if y = 1 and r0 ≤ 0 then
6: return (r1 − 1) mod+m
7: else
8: return r1
9: end if
Proof. The output of Decomposeq is an integer r1 such that
0 ≤ r1 < (q − 1)/α and another integer r0 such that ∥r0∥∞ ≤ α/2.
Because ∥z∥∞ ≤ α/2, the integer v1 B HighBitsq (r + z,α) either
stays the same as r1 or becomes r1 ± 1modulom = (q − 1)/α .More
precisely, if r0 > 0, then −α/2 < r0 + z ≤ α . This implies that v1 is
either r1 or r1+1 modm. If r0 ≤ 0, then we have −α ≤ r0+z ≤ α/2.
In this case, we have v1 = r1 or r1 − 1 modm.
TheMakeHintq routine checks whether r1 = v1 and outputs 0 if
this is so, and 1 if r1 , v1. The UseHintq routine uses the “hint” y
to either output r1 (if y = 0) or, depending on whether r0 > 0 or
not, output either r1 + 1 mod+m or r1 − 1 mod+m. 
The lemma below shows that r is not too far away from the
output of the UseHintq algorithm. This will be necessary for the
security of the scheme.
Lemma 3.2. Let (y, r ) ∈ {0, 1}×Zq and letv1 = UseHintq (y, r ,α).
If y = 0, then ∥r −v1 · α ∥∞ ≤ α/2; else ∥r −v1 · α ∥∞ ≤ α + 1.
Proof. Let (r1, r0) := Decomposeq (r ,α). We go through all
three cases of the UseHintq procedure.
Case 1 (y = 0): We have v1 = r1 and
r −v1 · α = r1 · α + r0 − r1 · α = r0 ,
which by definition has absolute value at most α/2.
Case 2 (y = 1 and r0 > 0): We have v1 = r1 + 1 − κ · (q − 1)/α
for κ = 0 or 1. Thus
r −v1 · α = r1 · α + r0 − (r1 + 1 − κ · (q − 1)/α) · α
= −α + r0 + κ · (q − 1).
After centered reduction modulo q, the latter has magnitude ≤ α .
Case 3 (y = 1 and r0 ≤ 0): We have v1 = r1 − 1 + κ · (q − 1)/α
for κ = 0 or 1. Thus
r −v1 · α = r1 · α + r0 − (r1 − 1 + κ · (q − 1)/α) · α
= α + r0 − κ · (q − 1).
After centered reduction modulo q, the latter quantity has magni-
tude ≤ α + 1. 
The next lemma will play a role in proving the strong existential
unforgeability of our signature scheme. It states that two different
y,y′ cannot lead to UseHintq (y, r ,α) = UseHintq (y′, r ,α).
Lemma 3.3. Let r ∈ Zq and y,y′ ∈ {0, 1}. If UseHintq (y, r ,α) =
UseHintq (y′, r ,α), then y = y′.
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Proof. Note that UseHintq (0, r ,α) = r1 and UseHintq (1, r ,α)
is equal to (r1 ± 1) mod+(q − 1)/α . Since (q − 1)/α ≥ 2, we have
that r1 , (r1 ± 1) mod+(q − 1)/α . 
The following lemma is a direct consequence of Lemmas 3.1
to 3.3.
Lemma 3.4. Suppose that q and α are positive integers satisfying
q > 2α , q ≡ 1 (mod α) and α even. Let r and z be vectors of ele-
ments in Rq where ∥z∥∞ ≤ α/2, and let y, y′ be vectors of bits. Then
the HighBitsq , MakeHintq , and UseHintq algorithms satisfy the
following properties:
(1) UseHintq (MakeHintq (z, r,α), r,α) = HighBitsq (r + z,α).
(2) Let v1 = UseHintq (y, r,α). Then ∥r − v1 · α ∥∞ ≤ α + 1.
Furthermore, if the number of 1’s in y is ω, then all except at
most ω coefficients of r − v1 · α will have magnitude at most
α/2 after centered reduction modulo q.
(3) For any y, y′, ifUseHintq (y, r,α) = UseHintq (y′, r,α), then
y = y′.
4 DILITHIUM
The scheme is built via the “Fiat-Shamir with Aborts” idea [36] and
resembles the Bai-Galbraith scheme [7]. The main difference is that
we compress the public key by a factor of a little larger than 2 and
this requires using the algorithms from Section 3 to create and use
hints for reconstructing high order bits of polynomials.
The parameters. The secret keys are chosen to have coefficients
of magnitude at most η. We set β integer so that we have ∥s ·
c ∥∞ < β with high probability (around 1 − 2−80) over the choices
of s ← Sη and c ← B60. The parameters γ1 and γ2 dictate the
rejection probability (see Equation (3)) and the size of the signatures:
the larger the γi ’s, the larger the signature, but the smaller the
probability of rejection.
4.1 The Signature Scheme
Our signature algorithm is described in Algorithms 8 to 10.
Algorithm 8 KeyGen()
1: ρ, ρ ′ ← {0, 1}256
2: A ∼ Rk×ℓq B Sam(ρ)
3: (s1, s2) ∼ Sℓη × Skη B Sam(ρ ′)
4: t B As1 + s2
5: t1 B Power2Roundq (t,d)
6: return (pk = (ρ, t1), sk = (ρ, s1, s2, t))
The key generation proceeds by choosing a random 256-bit
seed ρ and expanding into a matrix A ∈ Rk×ℓq by an extendable
output function Sam modeled as a random oracle. The secret keys
s1, s2 are generated from Sam expanding a random seed ρ ′ and
have uniformly random coefficients between −η and η (inclusively).
The value t = As1 + s2 is computed. The secret key is ρ, s1, s2, t,
while the public key is ρ, t1 with t1 output by Algorithm 2 (we have
t = t1 · 2d + t0 for some small t0).
The signing procedure starts by splitting the entire t = As1 + s2
into t1 and t0 such that t1 · 2d + t0 = t, where ∥t0∥∞ ≤ 2d−1.
Algorithm 9 Sign(sk = (ρ, s1, s2, t), µ ∈ M)
1: A ∼ Rk×ℓq B Sam(ρ)
2: t1 := Power2Roundq (t,d)
3: t0 B t − t1 · 2d
4: r ← {0, 1}256
5: y ∼ Sℓγ1−1 B Sam(r )
6: w B Ay
7: w1 B HighBitsq (w, 2γ2)
8: c B H(ρ, t1,w1, µ)
9: z B y + cs1
10: (r1, r0) := Decomposeq(w − cs2, 2γ2)
11: if ∥z∥∞ ≥ γ1 − β or ∥r0∥∞ ≥ γ2 − β or r1 , w1 then goto 4
12: h B MakeHintq (−ct0,w − cs2 + ct0, 2γ2)
13: if ∥ct0∥∞ ≥ γ2 or the number of 1’s in h is greater thanω then
goto 4
14: return σ B (z, h, c)
The next step of the signing algorithm has the signer sample y
with coefficients in Sγ1−1 (using the extendable output function
Sam and a random seed r ) and then compute w = Ay. Then the
signer writes w = 2γ2 · w1 + w0, with w0 between −γ2 and γ2
(inclusively), and computes c = H(ρ, t1,w1, µ) ∈ B60 using the
function introduced in Section 2.2.5 After obtaining c , the signer
computes z = y + cs. If some coefficient of z is at least γ1 − β ,
then the signing procedure restarts. The process also restarts if the
magnitude of some coefficient of r0 = LowBitsq (w − cs2, 2γ2) is
at least γ2 − β . This part of the protocol is necessary for security—
it makes sure that nothing about the secret key s1, s2 is leaked.
The last check makes sure that r1 = w1 and this is necessary for
correctness. We should point out that if ∥cs2∥∞ ≤ β , then ∥r0∥∞
being less than γ2 − β immediately implies that r1 = w1. Since
we want ∥cs2∥∞ ≤ β to be true with overwhelming probability
for security, the probability that this last check will be useful is
negligible. Still, we include it just to make the probability of a
verifier accepting a valid signature being 1, rather than negligibly
close to 1.
If all the checks pass and a restart is not necessary, then it can
be shown (see Section 4.2) that HighBitsq (Az − ct, 2γ2) = w1. At
this point, if the verifier knew the entire element t and (z, c), he
could have recovered w1 and checked that ∥z∥∞ < γ1 − β and
c = H(ρ, t1,w1, µ). However, since we want to compress the public
key, the verifier only knows t1. Hence, the signer needs to provide
a “hint” which will allow the verifier to compute HighBitsq (Az −
ct, 2γ2). This is done in Step 12. In Step 13, the verifier performs
some checks that will fail very rarely (much less than 1% of the time)
that do not really affect the total running time. Most importantly,
Step 12 is for compression and has no effect on the security of the
scheme under the assumption that the verifier has the entire key t
(thus the actual scheme may even be more secure in practice).
5Note that all these operations feature some trade-off between storage and computation
time. For example, to optimize the computation time, one can store t0 in the secret
key and can “partially compute” H(ρ, t1, w1, µ) by storing the part that depends on ρ
and t1 as part of the signing key (and this way storing t1 is no longer necessary). On the
other hand, if one is concerned about the secret key size, one can define sk = (ρ, ρ′)
and recompute everything when signing.
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Algorithm 10 Verify(pk = (ρ, t1), µ ∈ M,σ = (z, h, c))
1: A B Sam(ρ)
2: w1 B UseHintq (h,Az − ct1 · 2d , 2γ2)
3: if c = H (ρ, t1,w1, µ) and ∥z∥∞ < γ1 − β and the number of 1’s
in h is ≤ ω then
4: return 1
5: else
6: return 0
7: end if
Finally, verification works by using the signature and the public
key to reconstruct the w1 and then check that c = H(ρ, t1,w1, µ)
and that all the coefficients of z1 are less than γ1 − β , and that the
number of 1’s in h is no greater than ω. The number of ones in h
is determined by how many values of ct0 cause a carry to occur.
Since ct0 is not too large, there is a significantly larger probability
that a carry does not occur. Experimentally with the parameters we
recommend in Table 1, we computed the upper-bounds such that
the number of carries is not larger thanω with very high probability
(much larger than 99%).
Concrete parameters. We provide concrete parameters and secu-
rity estimates in Table 1.
The public key consists of ρ and t1, which are 32 and 32 · k ·
(⌈log(q)⌉ −d) bytes, respectively. The signature consists of z, which
is 32 · ℓ · ⌈log(2γ1)⌉ bytes, the polynomial c which can be repre-
sented with 40 bytes (32 bytes to give the position of the non-zero
coefficients and 8 bytes to distinguish between the 1’s and the −1’s).
The vector h contains 256 · k binary coefficients, ω of which are 1’s.
The information-theoretic lower bound for the number of bits to
represent such a vector is log
(256·k
ω
)
bits, but such a representation
would be costly to obtain.
Instead, we store h as follows. We break up h into k vectors
h1, . . . , hk of dimension 256. The position of the 1’s in each hi
can be represented with 1 byte each. Since there are ω 1’s, this
amounts toω bytes. Furthermore, we need to specify the separation
between the k vectors. Since there are k vectors, there are k − 1
separator. One needs ⌈logω⌉ bits to represent each separation. Since
ω < 128 in all our instantiations, this amounts to 7 bits, which
we round up to 1 byte for convenience. Thus the total cost (in
bytes) to represent h is ω + k − 1. One could use slightly more
compact representations and possibly save around 20 bytes in the
representation of h. Nevertheless, we use the method above for the
convenience of having each position be represented by exactly 1
byte.
4.2 Correctness
In this section, we prove the correctness of the signature scheme.
We use the notation of Algorithms 8 to 10.
If ∥ct0∥∞ < γ2, then by Lemma 3.4 we know that
UseHintq (h,w − cs2 + ct0, 2γ2) = HighBitsq (w − cs2, 2γ2) .
Since w = Ay and t = As1 + s2, we have that
w − cs2 = Ay − cs2 = A(z − cs1) − cs2 = Az − ct, (1)
and w − cs2 + ct0 = Az − ct1 · 2d . Therefore the verifier computes
UseHintq (h,Az − ct1 · 2d , 2γ2)
= HighBitsq (w − cs2, 2γ2) .
Furthermore, because the Signer also checks in Line 11 that
r1 = w1, this is equivalent to
HighBitsq (w − cs2, 2γ2) = HighBitsq (w, 2γ2). (2)
Therefore, the w1 computed by the verifier is the same as that
of the signer, and the verification procedure will always accept.
4.3 Zero-Knowledge and Simulation
For the sake of simplicity, in this proof (as well as in the reduction
in Section 4.5), we will be assuming that the public key is t rather
than t1. The fact that t0 is not part of the genuine public key is not
used anywhere in the proof.
We want to first compute the probability that some particular
(z, c) is generated in Step 9 taken over the randomness of y and the
random oracle H which is modeled as a random function. We have
Pr[z, c] = Pr[c] · Pr[y = z − cs1 | c].
Whenever z has all its coefficients less than γ1−β then the above
probability is exactly the same for every such tuple (z, c). This is
because ∥csi ∥∞ ≤ β (with overwhelming probability), and thus
∥z − cs1∥∞ ≤ γ1 − 1, which is a valid value of y. Therefore, if we
only output z when all its coefficients have magnitudes less than
γ1 − β , then the resulting distribution will be uniformly random
over Sℓγ1−β−1 × B60.
The simulation of the signature follows [7, 37]. The simulator
picks a uniformly random (z, c) in Sℓγ1−β−1 ×B60, after which it also
makes sure that
∥r0∥∞ = ∥LowBitsq (w − cs2, 2γ2)∥∞ < γ2 − β .
By Equation (1), we know that w− cs2 = Az− ct, and therefore the
simulator can perfectly simulate this as well.
If z does indeed satisfy ∥LowBitsq (w−cs2, 2γ2)∥∞ < γ2−β , then
as long as ∥cs2∥∞ ≤ β , we will have
r1 = HighBitsq (w − cs2, 2γ2) = HighBitsq (w, 2γ2) = w1.
Since our β was chosen such that the probability (over the choice
of c, s2) that ∥cs2∥∞ < β is very close to 1, the simulator does not
need to perform the check that r1 = w1 and can always assume
that it passes (we discuss the effect that this has on actual security
in Section 4.4).
We can then program
H(ρ, t1,w1, µ) ← c .
Unless we have already set the value of H(ρ, t1,w1, µ) to something
else, the resulting pair (z, c) has the same distribution as in a genuine
signature of µ. If H(ρ, t1,w1, µ) was previously assigned a value,
then it must be that
HighBitsq (Az − ct, 2γ2) = w1 = w′1 = HighBitsq (Az′ − c ′t, 2γ2)
for some previously-chosen z′, c ′. The above implies that there exist
vectors e, e′with ∥e∥∞, ∥e′∥∞ ≤ γ2+1, such thatA(z−z′)+(e−e′) =
(c − c ′)t. Thus if z , z′ or c , c ′ (which happens with probability
greater than 1 − 2−10000 even for our smallest parameter set), we
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Table 1: Parameters for Dilithium.
weak medium recommended very high
q 8380417 8380417 8380417 8380417
d 14 14 14 14
weight of c 60 60 60 60
γ1 = (q − 1)/16 523776 523776 523776 523776
γ2 = γ1/2 261888 261888 261888 261888
(k, ℓ) (3, 2) (4, 3) (5, 4) (6, 5)
η 7 6 5 3
β 330 285 235 145
ω 64 80 96 120
pk size = 32 · k · (⌈log(q)⌉ − d) + 32 bytes 896 1184 1472 1760
sig size = 32 · ℓ · ⌈log(2γ1)⌉ + (ω + k − 1) + 40 bytes 1386 2043 2700 3365
Repetitions (from Eq. (4)) 3.65 4.65 5 3.35
BKZ block-size b to break SIS 235 355 475 605
Best Known Classical bit-cost 68 103 138 176
Best Known Quantum bit-cost 62 94 125 160
Best Plausible bit-cost 48 73 98 125
BKZ block-size b to break LWE 200 340 485 595
Best Known Classical bit-cost 58 100 141 174
Best Known Quantum bit-cost 53 91 128 158
Best Plausible bit-cost 41 71 100 124
KeyGen cycles 173, 100 325, 746 522, 992 723, 974
Sign cycles 741, 844 1, 530, 912 2, 253, 378 1, 856, 048
Verify cycles 239, 572 413, 644 625, 968 871, 190
KeyGen cycles (AVX2 optimized) 97, 544 162, 670 251, 590 323, 112
Sign cycles (AVX2 optimized) 404, 298 637, 994 1, 042, 250 838, 428
Verify cycles (AVX2 optimized) 131, 316 205, 684 297, 590 402, 738
have found the same type of solution (actually, an even slightly
harder-to-find one) as the one in Lemma 4.1 uponwhich the security
of our scheme rests.6
All the other steps (after Step 11) of the signing algorithm are
performed using public information and are therefore simulatable.
We now want to compute the probability that Step 11 will not
result in a restart. The probability that ∥z∥∞ < γ1−β can be compu-
ted by considering each coefficient separately. For each coefficient σ
of cs1, the corresponding coefficient of zwill be between −γ1+β +1
and γ1 − β − 1 (inclusively) whenever the corresponding coefficient
of yi is between −γ1 + β + 1 − σ and γ1 − β − 1 − σ . The size of
this range is 2(γ1 − β) − 1, and the coefficients of y have 2γ1 − 1
possibilities. Thus the probability that every coefficient of y is in
the good range is(
2(γ1 − β) − 1
2γ1 − 1
)ℓn
=
(
1 − β
γ1 − 1/2
)ℓn
≈ e−nβℓ/γ1 , (3)
where we used the fact that our values of γ1 are large compared
to 1/2.
6With a more involved (and most likely messy) analysis, there is a good possibility
that one could unconditionally prove that for any vector r, PrA,z,c [HighBitsq (Az −
ct, γ2) = r ] is negligible.
We now move to computing the probability that we have
∥r0∥∞ = ∥LowBitsq (w − cs2, 2γ2)∥∞ < γ2 − β .
If we (heuristically) assume that the low order bits are uniformly
distributed modulo 2γ2, then there is a(
2(γ2 − β) − 1
2γ2
)kn
≈ e−nβk/γ2
probability that all the coefficients are in the good range (using the
fact that our values of β are large compared to 1/2.
As we already mentioned, if ∥cs2∥∞ ≤ β , then ∥r0∥∞ < γ2 − β
implies that r1 = w1. Thus the last check should succeed with over-
whelming probability when the previous check passed. Therefore,
the probability that Step 11 passes is
≈ e−nβ (ℓ/γ1+k/γ2) . (4)
4.4 A Discussion on the Role of β .
From (4), we see that the smaller β is, the fewer repetitions will
be needed to output a valid signature. On the other hand, we also
saw in Section 4.3 that having ∥cs2∥∞ ≤ β is necessary in order to
perfectly simulate the distribution of a valid signer. A trivial bound
for ∥csi ∥∞ is 60 · η, which for the recommended parameter set in
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Table 1 is 300. With such a value for β , the expected number of
repetitions would go up from approximately 5 to 7.8 (using the
formula in (4)), which is an increase of over 50% in the running
time of the signing algorithm.
This is why we instead choose a smaller value for β such that
Prs,c [∥cs∥∞ > β] ≈ 2−80. If we assume that the signing algorithm
will perform no more than 264 signing operations, this implies that
the signer will expect to encounter the scenario where ∥cs2∥∞ > β
less than once. If this scenario does arise, then the probability distri-
bution (over the choice of y) of the signature changes slightly in that
it makes it impossible for some borderline values in the signature
set Sℓγ1−β−1 to appear. For example, if we encounter ∥cs2∥∞ > β
10 out of 264 times, then the expected number of times that the
coefficientγ1−β−1will appear could go down from around 264/220
to 264/220 − 10. Even if this slight decrease could be detected, it
is unclear what the adversary would do with this information –
he does not even know which of the signatures had the skewed
samples. In this scenario, we remain very confident that the security
of the scheme is not affected by the 2−80 probability of this bad
event and believe that it is definitely not worthwhile to increase
the value of β from 235 to 300.
Lowering β even further such that, for example, Prs,c [∥cs∥∞ >
β] ≈ 2−30 (making β ≈ 150) is not advisable. An adversary who
sees 264 signatures would observe a noticeable skew. While we do
not see a clear attack, such a discrepancy in probabilities looks, to
us, a little worrisome. On the other hand, if the signature scheme
were used in a scenario where only, say, 220 signatures would ever
be given out, then it could make sense to lower the β and decrease
the running time by a factor of 2. We think that exploring the issues
in this section more formally is a very interesting topic for further
research.
4.5 Security Proof
Throughout the proof, we will make the assumption that the ad-
versary gets t = As1 + s2 as the public key. This assumption is
favorable to the adversary, as in the real scheme he only gets the
high order bits of t. In practice, therefore, the scheme may be even
more difficult for the adversary to break.
Lemma 4.1. Forging a signature implies finding u1, u2,u3 such
that ∥u1∥∞ ≤ 2γ1, ∥u2∥∞ ≤ 4γ2+2, ∥u3∥∞ ≤ 2 such thatAu1+u2 =
u3t1 · 2d and (u1, u2,u3) , 0. Furthermore, vector u2 has at most 2ω
coefficients of absolute value greater than 2γ2.
Proof. The public key is set to be pk = (A, t). Signature que-
ries by the adversary are created via the procedure described in
Section 4.3. We now describe our extractor when the Adversary
produces a winning query.
If the Adversary creates a valid signature (z, h, c) for a message µ,
then he must have queried
H(ρ, t1,w1, µ) = c, (5)
where w1 = UseHintq (h,Az − ct1 · 2d , 2γ2), either directly by que-
rying H or indirectly during a signing query.
Case 1: If c was queried during a signing query, then the reduction
already knows another (z′, h′, c) (and the associated w′1) for a mes-
sage µ ′ such that H(ρ, t1,w′1, µ ′) = c = H(ρ, t1,w1, µ). This implies
that µ = µ ′ and w1 = w′1, or else we found a second pre-image
for c . Since w1 = w′1, it must be that
UseHintq (h,Az − t1c · 2d , 2γ2) = w1,
UseHintq (h′,Az′ − t1c · 2d , 2γ2) = w1.
If z = z′, then Lemma 3.4 states that we must have h = h′, which is
in contradiction with the assumption that the adversary has found
a new signature. Thus it must be that z , z′. By Lemma 3.4, we
also know that
∥Az − t1c · 2d −w1 · 2γ2∥∞ ≤ 2γ2 + 1,
∥Az′ − t1c · 2d −w1 · 2γ2∥∞ ≤ 2γ2 + 1.
By the triangular inequality, this implies that
∥A(z − z′)∥∞ ≤ 4γ2 + 2 .
This can be rewritten as
A(z − z′) + u = 0
for some u such that ∥u∥∞ ≤ 4γ2 + 2 where z − z′ , 0. Because
h and h′ have all except ω elements equal to 0, we know from
Lemma 3.4 that all but ω coefficients of Az − t1c · 2d − w1 · 2γ2
and Az′ − t1c · 2d −w1 · 2γ2 are less than γ2. Therefore all but 2ω
coefficients of u are less than 2γ2.
Case 2:We now handle the case where the query in Equation (5)
was done directly to H. A standard forking lemma argument shows
that the reduction can then extract two signatures (z, h, c) and
(z′, h′, c ′) for c , c ′ such that
UseHintq (h,Az − t1c · 2d , 2γ2) = w1,
UseHintq (h′,Az′ − t1c ′ · 2d , 2γ2) = w1.
By Lemma 3.4, we know that
∥Az − t1c · 2d −w1 · 2γ2∥∞ ≤ 2γ2 + 1,
∥Az′ − t1c ′ · 2d −w1 · 2γ2∥∞ ≤ 2γ2 + 1.
By the triangular inequality, this implies that
∥A(z − z′) − t1 · 2d · (c − c ′)∥∞ ≤ 4γ2 + 2 .
This can be rewritten as
A(z − z′) + u = t1 · 2d · (c − c ′)
for some u such that ∥u∥∞ ≤ 4γ2 + 2. For the same reason as in the
first case, at most 2ω coefficients of u can be greater than 2γ2. 
5 CONCRETE SECURITY ANALYSIS
We follow the general methodology from [3, 15] to analyze the
security of our signature scheme, with minor adaptations. This
methodology is significantly more conservative than prior ones
used in lattice-based cryptography. In particular, we assume the
adversary can run the asymptotically best algorithms known, with
no overhead compared to the asymptotic run-times. In particular,
we assume the adversary can cheaply handle huge amounts of
(possibly quantum) memory.
We find this approach much sounder than relying on the cur-
rently best codes for the underlying tasks as the practical aspects
of lattice algorithms have received little attention compared to in-
teger factorization and discrete logarithm algorithms. Considering
the gap between theory and practice of lattice reduction, and the
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attention drawn to it due to potential deployment of lattice-based
cryptography, we conclude that practical improvements are very li-
kely to occur. This conservatism is in line with the goal of long-term
post-quantum security. We note that despite this security analysis
methodology, our schemes remain competitive in practice.
5.1 Lattice Reduction and Core-SVP Hardness
The best known algorithm for finding very short non-zero vectors
in Euclidean lattices is the Block–Korkine–Zolotarev algorithm
(BKZ) [50], proposed by Schnorr and Euchner in 1991. More re-
cently, it was proven to quickly converge to its fix-point [32] and
improved in practice [21]. Yet, what it achieves asymptotically re-
mains unchallenged.
BKZ with block-size b makes calls to an algorithm that solves
the Shortest lattice Vector Problem (SVP) in dimension b. The se-
curity of our scheme relies on the necessity to run BKZ with a
large block-size b and the fact that the cost of solving SVP is ex-
ponential in b. The best known classical SVP solver [8] runs in
time ≈ 2cC ·b with cC = log2
√
3/2 ≈ 0.292. The best known quan-
tum SVP solver [34, Sec. 14.2.10] runs in time ≈ 2cQ ·b with cQ =
log2
√
13/9 ≈ 0.265. One may hope to improve these run-times,
but going below ≈ 2cP ·b with cP = log2
√
4/3 ≈ 0.2075 would
require a theoretical breakthrough. Indeed, the best known SVP
solvers rely on covering the b-dimensional sphere with cones of
center-to-edge angle π/3: this requires 2cP ·b cones. The subscripts
C, Q, P respectively stand for Classical, Quantum and Paranoid.
The strength of BKZ increases with b. More concretely, given
as input a basis (c1, . . . , cn ) of an n-dimensional lattice, BKZ repe-
atedly uses the b-dimensional SVP-solver on lattices of the form
(ci+1(i), . . . , cj (i)) where i ≤ n, j = min(n, i + b) and where ck (i)
denotes the projection of ck orthogonally to the vectors (c1, . . . , ci ).
The effect of these calls is to flatten the curve of the ℓi = log2 ∥ci (i−
1)∥’s (for i = 1, . . . ,n). At the start of the execution, the ℓi ’s typically
decrease fast, at least locally. As BKZ preserves the determinant
of the ci ’s, the sum of the ℓi ’s remains constant throughout the
execution, and after a (small) polynomial number of SVP calls, BKZ
has made the ℓi ’s decrease less. It can be heuristically estimated
that for sufficiently large b, the local slope of the ℓi ’s converges to
slope(b) = 1
b − 1 log2
(
b
2πe (π · b)
1/b
)
,
unless the local input ℓi ’s are already too small or too large. The
quantity slope(b) decreases with b, implying that the larger b the
flatter the output ℓi ’s.
In our case, the input ℓi ’s are of the following form (cf. Fig. 2).
The first ones are all equal to log2 q and the last ones are all equal
to 0. BKZ will flatten the jump, decreasing ℓi ’s with small i’s and
increasing ℓi ’s with large i’s. However, the local slope slope(b)may
not be sufficiently small to make the very first ℓi ’s decrease and the
very last ℓi ’s increase. Indeed, BKZ will not increase (resp. increase)
some ℓi ’s if these are already smaller (resp. larger) than ensured
by the local slope guarantee. In our case, the ℓi ’s are always of the
following form at the end of the execution:
• The first ℓi ’s are constant equal to log2 q (this is the possibly
empty Zone 1).
• Then they decrease linearly, with slope slope(b) (this is the
never-empty Zone 2).
• The last ℓi ’s are constant equal to 0 (this is the possibly
empty Zone 3).
The graph is continuous, i.e., if Zone 1 (resp. Zone 3) is not empty,
then Zone 2 starts with ℓi = log2 q (resp. ends with ℓi = 0).
5.2 Key-Recovery Attack: Solving Module-LWE
The attacker may attempt to recover the secret key (s1, s2) ∈ Rℓ×Rk
from the public key A, t = As1 + s2. As each of the k + ℓ elements
of the secret key is sampled from Sη , this is exactly an instance of
the Module-LWE problem.
Any such Module-LWE instance with dimensions ℓ,k can be
viewed as an LWE instance of dimensions 256 · ℓ and 256 ·k . Indeed,
the above can be rewritten as finding vec(s1), vec(s2) ∈ Z256·ℓ ×
Z256·k from (rot(A), vec(t)), where vec(·) maps a vector of ring
elements to the vector obtained by concatenating the coefficients of
its coordinates, and rot(A) ∈ Z256·k×256·ℓq is obtained by replacing
all entries ai j ∈ Rq of A by the 256× 256matrix whose z-th column
is vec
(
xz−1 · ai j
)
.
Given an LWE instance, there are two lattice-based attacks. The
primal attack and the dual attack. Here, the primal attack consists
in finding a short non-zero vector in the lattice Λ = {x ∈ Zd : Mx =
0 mod q}whereM = (rot(A)[1:m] |Im |vec(t)[1:m]) is anm×d matrix
where d = 256 · ℓ +m + 1 andm ≤ 256 · k . Indeed, it is sometime
not optimal to use all the given equations in lattice attacks.
We tried all possible numberm of rows, and, for each trial, we in-
creased the blocksize of b until the value ℓd−b obtained as explained
above was deemed sufficiently large. As explained in [3, Sec. 6.3], if
2ℓd−b is greater than the expected norm of (vec(s1), vec(s2)) after
projection orthogonally to the first d −b vectors, it is likely that the
Module-LWE solution can be easily extracted from the BKZ output.
The dual attack consists in finding a short non-zero vector in
the lattice Λ′ = {(x, y) ∈ Zm × Zd : MT x + y = 0 mod q)}, M =
(rot(A)[1:m]) is anm × d matrix where d = 256 · ℓ andm ≤ 256 · k .
Again, for each value ofm, we increased the value of b until the
value ℓ1 obtained as explained above was deemed sufficiently small
according the analysis of [3, Sec. 6.3].
5.3 Forgery Attack: Solving Module-SIS
The attacker may also attempt to forge a signature. By Lemma 4.1,
this implies finding u1, u2,u3 not all zero such that ∥u1∥∞ ≤ 2γ1,
∥u2∥∞ ≤ 4γ2 + 2, and ∥u3∥∞ ≤ 2 such that Au1 + u2 = u3t1 · 2d .
This amounts to solving homogeneous Module-SIS for the matrix7
(A|Ik |t1) and infinity norm bounds B = max(2γ1, 4γ2 + 2, 2d+1).
Note that the Module-SIS instance can be mapped to a SIS instance
by considering the matrix rot(A|Ik |t1) ∈ Z256·k×256·(ℓ+k+1)q . The
attacker may consider a subset ofw columns, and let the solution
coefficients corresponding to the dismissed columns be zero.
Remark 5.1. An unusual aspect here is that we are considering
the infinity norm, rather than the Euclidean norm. Further, for
7One could tweak this matrix to (A |Ik |t12d ) to enforce stronger bounds ≤ 2 on the
last coefficients, but it severely complicates the analysis. This approximation is made
in favor of the adversary, whose real task is harder than what we analyze: this provides
a lower bound on the cost of such an attack.
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Figure 2: Evolution of Gram-Schmidt length in log-scale under BKZ reduction for various blocksizes. The area under the
curves remains constant, and the slope in Zone 2 decrease with the blocksize. Note that Zone 3 may disappear before Zone 1,
depending on the shape of the input basis.
our specific parameters, the Euclidean norms of the solutions are
above q. In particular, the vector (q, 0, . . . , 0)T belongs to the lattice,
has Euclidean norm below that of the solution, but its infinity norm
above the requirement. This raises difficulties in analyzing the
strength of BKZ towards solving our infinity norm SIS instances:
indeed, even with small values of b, the first ℓi ’s are short (they
correspond to q-vectors), even though they are not solutions.
For each numberw of selected columns and for each value of b,
we compute the estimated BKZ output ℓi ’s, as explained above. We
then consider the smallest i such that ℓi is below log2 q and the
largest j such that ℓj above 0. These correspond to the vectors that
were modified by BKZ, with smallest and largest indices, respecti-
vely. In fact, for the same cost as a call to the SVP-solver, we can
obtain
√
4/3b vectors with Euclidean norm ≈ 2ℓi after projection
orthogonally to the first i − 1 basis vectors. Now, let us look closely
at the shape of such a vector. As the first i − 1 basis vectors are the
first i − 1 canonical unit vectors multiplied by q, projecting ortho-
gonally to these consists in zeroing the first i − 1 coordinates. The
remainingw−i+1 coordinates have total Euclidean norm≈ 2ℓi ≈ q,
and the lastw − j coordinates are 0. We heuristically assume that
these coordinates have similar magnitudes σ ≈ 2ℓi /√j − i + 1; we
model each such coordinate as a Gaussian of standard deviation σ .
We assume that each one of our
√
4/3b vectors has its first i − 1
coordinates independently uniformly distributed modulo q, and
finally compute the probability that all coordinates in both ranges
[0, i−1] and [i, j] are less than B in absolute value. Our cost estimate
is the inverse of that probability multiplied by the run-time of our
b-dimensional SVP-solver.
Forgetting q-vectors. For all the parameter sets proposed in this
paper, the best parametrization of the attack above kept the basis
in a shape with a non-trivial Zone 1. We note that the coordina-
tes in this range have a quite lower probability of passing the ℓ∞
constraint than coordinates in Zone 2. We therefore considered a
strategy consisting of “forgetting” the q-vectors, by re-randomizing
the input basis before running the BKZ algorithm. For the same
blocksize b, this makes Zone 1 of the output basis disappear (BKZ
does not find the q-vectors), at the cost of producing a basis with
first vectors of larger Euclidean norms. This is depicted in Fig. 3.
It turns out that this strategy always improves over the previous
strategy for the parameter ranges considered in this paper. We
therefore used this strategy for our security estimates.
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Figure 3: Effect of forgettingq-vectors by randomization, un-
der the same BKZ-blocksize b.
5.4 On Other Attacks
For our parameters, the BKW [14] and Arora–Ge [5] families of
algorithms are far from competitive.
Algebraic attacks. One specificity of our LWE and SIS instances
is that they are inherited from Module-LWE and Module-SIS in-
stances. One may wonder whether the extra algebraic structure of
the resulting lattices can be exploited by an attacker. The line of
work of [12, 18, 22, 23] did indeed found new cryptanalytic results
on certain algebraic lattices, but [23] mentions serious obstacles
towards breaking cryptographic instances of Ring-LWE. By swit-
ching from Ring-LWE to Module-LWE, we get even further away
from those weak algebraic lattice problems.
Dense sublattice attacks. Kirchner and Fouque [33] showed that
the existence of many linearly independent and unexpectedly short
lattice vectors (much shorter than Minkowski’s bound) helps BKZ
run better than expected in some cases. This could happen for our
primal LWE attack, by extendingM = (rot(A)[1:m] |Im |vec(t)[1:m])
to (rot(A)[1:m] |Im |rot(t)[1:m]): the associated lattice now has 256
linearly independent short vectors rather than a single one. The
Kirchner-Fouque analysis of BKZ works best if both q and the
ratio between the number of unexpectedly short vectors and the
lattice dimension are high. In the NTRU case, for example, the ratio
is 1/2, and, for some schemes derived from NTRU, the modulus q
is also large. We considered this refined analysis of BKZ in our
setup, but, to become relevant for our parameters, it requires a
parameter b which is higher than needed with the usual analysis
of BKZ. Note that [33] also arrived to the conclusion that this
attack is irrelevant in the small modulus regime, and is mostly a
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threat to fully homomorphic encryption schemes and cryptographic
multilinear maps.
Note that, once again, the switch from Ring-LWE to Module-
LWE takes us further away from lattices admitting unconventional
attacks. Indeed, the dimension ratio of the dense sub-lattice is 1/2
in NTRU, at most 1/3 in lattices derived from Ring-LWE, and at
most 1/(ℓ + 2) in lattices derived from Module-LWE.
Specialized attack against ℓ∞-SIS. At last, we would like to men-
tion that it is not clear whether the attack sketched in Section 5.3
above for SIS in infinity norm is optimal. Indeed, as we have seen,
this approach produces many vectors, with some rather large uni-
form coordinates (at indices 1, . . . , i), and smaller Gaussian ones (at
indices i, . . . , j). In our current analysis, we simply hope that one
of the vector satisfies the ℓ∞ bound. Instead, one could combine
them in ways that decrease the size of the first (large) coefficients,
while letting the other (small) coefficients grow a little bit.
This situation created by the use of ℓ∞-SIS (see Remark 5.1) has
— to the best of our knowledge — not been studied in detail. After a
preliminary analysis, we do not consider such an improved attack a
serious threat to our concrete security claims, especially in the light
of the approximations already made in the favor of the adversary.
Nevertheless, we believe this question deserves a detailed study,
which we leave to future work.
6 IMPLEMENTATION
To illustrate the performance of the Dilithium signature scheme
we implemented the scheme with our parameter sets, using optimi-
zations in Intel’s AVX2 vector instruction set. We benchmark the
implementation on one core of an Intel Core-i7 4770k (Haswell) pro-
cessor. We follow the standard practice of disabling hyperthreading
and TurboBoost.
6.1 Primitives and Reference Implementation
In previous sections, Dilithium was introduced in abstract terms
without fixing concrete instantiations of the function Sam. This
subsection provides concrete detail on our implementation choices.
Symmetric primitives.Wedecided to instantiate Samwith the ex-
pandable output function SHAKE-128, standardized in FIPS 202 [45]
so that Dilithium rely on the Keccak-f 1600 permutation, standar-
dized after years of cryptanalytic scrutiny through the course of
the SHA-3 competition. Obviously, different implementations are
free to use whichever pseudo-random generator is offering the
best performance and security on their respective platform. Other
options include the ChaCha20 stream cipher [10], the BLAKE2X
extendable output function [6], or SHA256 for all hashes (with “out-
put extension for G via MGF1”; see [44, App. B.2.1]), and AES in
counter mode for the expansion of seeds; this latter choice would
certainly be faster than SHAKE-128 on platforms with hardware
AES and SHA256 support.
NTT computations. For polynomial multiplication we use an
NTT-based algorithm as is standard in lattice-based cryptography
(see [3, 25, 31, 39, 42, 48, 49], among others). Contrary to previous
implementations that utilized floating point vector instructions
(see, for example, [3, 31]), our vectorized AVX2-code is written
with integer instructions only. For fast constant-time reductions
modulo q we use the Montgomery algorithm, where floating point
implementations typically multiply by a precomputed floating point
inverse of q and round. We make heavy use of lazy reductions and
only reduce values when they do not fit into 32 bit or a standard
representative is needed. A full multiplication of two polynomials
in the ring Zq [X ]/(X 256 + 1) comprising two forward NTTs, one
inverse NTT, and pointwise multiplication, requires about 5, 000
cycles.
Generation of noise. Noise polynomials in Dilithium have coeffi-
cients sampled uniformly in [−η,η]. To obtain such a noise polyno-
mial, we first sample a random 32-byte seed r and expand it using
SHAKE-128 (i.e., Sam(r )). We then use rejection sampling on each
output byte. (As stated above, the choice of how the 256 uniformly
random bytes are generated can be a local, platform-dependent
choice.)
6.2 Results and Comparisons with Related
Works
Our results are presented in Table 1. In particular, for our recom-
mended parameter set, we measure a total of 1, 042, 250 cycles for
the complete signature generation. Key generation costs 251, 590
cycles, and verification consumes 297, 590 cycles. Note that our
“very high” parameter set achieves better performance for a larger
signature due to the fact that the manner in which the parameters
were set results in a smaller rejection rate.
In order to compare these results to other post-quantum sig-
nature schemes, we consider the performance figures reported
in [11, 20]. (We note that BLISS [25] did not claim any post-quantum
security.) The MQDSS signature generation is reported to take
8 510 616 cycles on an Intel Core i7-4770K CPU at 3.5GHz (with
an “extensive use of AVX2 instructions”) [20] for a signature of
40 952 Bytes. The hash-based SPHINCS signature generation is re-
ported to take 51 636 372 cycles on an Intel Core i7-4770K CPU
at 3.5GHz (with “focused [...] optimization efforts on [the signing
procedure]”) for a signature of ≈ 41 000 Bytes [11]. These results
provide confidence that our implementation, using AVX2 instructi-
ons, is performing very favourably.
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A PRELIMINARIES FOR DILITHIUM-G
We use the same rings as in Dilithium. In particular, we work over
R and Rq with the same n = 256 and q = 8380417. The main
implementation difference between Dilithium and Dilithium-G is
that in the signing algorithm of the latter we will be performing
sampling from a discrete Gaussian distribution rather than from
the uniform one.
Discrete Gaussian distribution. Since the ring R is isomorphic
to Z256 as an additive group and has the same geometry, rather
than sampling over Z256, we will say that we are sampling over R.
Similarly, the set Rk has the same geometry as Z256·k . For σ ∈ R+
and positive integer k , we define the distribution over Rk ,
Dkσ (r) = ρσ (r)/ρσ (Rk ) where ρσ (Rk ) =
∑
r∈Rk
ρσ (r) ,
and ρσ (r) = exp(−∥r∥2/(2σ 2)) for r ∈ Rk .
Producing “hints”. We introduce the procedures MakeGHintq
and UseGHintq for generating and using hints, respectively (see
Algorithms 11 and 12), that will be used in Dilithium-G instead of
MakeHintq and UseHintq .
Algorithm 11MakeGHintq (z, r ,α)
1: m B (q − 1)/α
2: r1 := HighBitsq (r ,α)
3: v1 := HighBitsq (r + z,α)
4: return (v1 − r1) mod±m
Algorithm 12 UseGHintq (y, r ,α)
1: m B (q − 1)/α
2: r1 := HighBitsq (r ,α)
3: return (r1 + y) mod+m
Themain differencewithMakeHintq andUseHintq from Section 3
is that the hints are no longer restricted to being one bit. The reason
is that the small integer z is no longer bounded within an inter-
val, but is rather generated according to a Gaussian distribution.
It would be very wasteful to our scheme to pick an interval that
is large enough so that the carry vector can be at most 1. For this
reason, we allow z to cause larger carries.
Lemmas A.1 and A.2 are analogous to Lemmas 3.1 and 3.3 from
Section 3.2. We will not need an equivalent of Lemma 3.2 because
the verification procedure will implicitly check the length of the
solution.
Lemma A.1. Let r , z be integers. Then
UseGHintq (MakeGHintq (z, r ,α), r ,α)
= HighBitsq (z + r ,α).
Proof. Let v1 = HighBitsq (r + z,α). We have that
UseGHintq
(
MakeGHintq (z, r ,α), r ,α
)
= v1 mod+m.
Thus we just need to show that v1 is always a value between 0
andm − 1. In other words, we need to show that the Decomposeq
routine always outputs (r1, r0)where 0 ≤ r1 < m−1. Note that r1 =
(r − (r mod± α))/α . The numerator is always between 0 and q − 1
(inclusively), but the procedure sets it to 0 if it is q − 1. We thus
have 0 ≤ r1 < (q − 1)/α =m. 
Lemma A.2. Letm = (q − 1)/α , r ∈ Zq and y,y′ ∈ (−m/2,m/2]
integers. If UseGHintq (y, r ,α) = UseGHintq (y′, r ,α), then y = y′.
Proof. If UseGHintq (y, r ,α) = UseGHintq (y′, r ,α), then y =
y′ mod+m. Since |y |, |y′ | ≤ m/2, this is only possible if y = y′. 
As in Section 3.2, we deduce the following lemma.
Lemma A.3. Suppose that q and α are positive integers satisfying
q ≡ 1 (mod α). Letm = (q − 1)/α , r and z be vectors of elements
in Rq and y, y′ be integral vectors of elements in (−m/2,m/2]. Then
the Decomposeq , MakeGHintq , and UseGHintq algorithms satisfy
the following properties:
(1) UseGHintq (MakeGHintq (z, r,α), r,α)
= HighBitsq (z + r,α).
(2) If UseGHintq (y, r,α) = UseGHintq (y′, r,α), then y = y′.
B DILITHIUM-G: NORMALLY-DISTRIBUTED
DIGITAL SIGNATURES
In this section, we propose a variant of Dilithium, called Dilithium-
G, that uses a discrete Gaussian distribution instead of the uniform
distribution Sη (Appendix A introduces the new notation used in
this section). Themain conceptual difference between this signature
and Dilithium is in the way that the rejection sampling is done. In
Dilithium, the rejection sampling is used to make the distribution
of z uniform in a hypercube, whereas Dilithium-G uses a different
kind of rejection sampling which makes the vector (z1, z2) take the
discrete Gaussian distribution. As was shown in [37], rejection sam-
pling in this manner can create signatures that are asymptotically
shorter (in the ℓ2-norm) by a factor of O(
√
n · (k + ℓ)).
Other than the difference in the rejection sampling algorithm,
there is also a slight difference in the output of theMakeHintq algo-
rithm. In the previous scheme, the smaller term in theMakeHintq
could only increase or decrease by 1 the higher order coefficient
of the sum. When the coefficients are discrete Gaussians, however,
there is no longer a hard bound, and so the higher order coefficients
of the sum can change by other values. Therefore the hint h is no
longer encoding 0’s or 1’s as before, but rather larger integers.
B.1 The Signature Scheme
Dilithium-G is described in Algorithms 13 to 15.
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Algorithm 13 KeyGen()
1: ρ ′ ← {0, 1}256
2: (s1, s2) ∼ Sℓη × Skη B Sam(ρ ′)
3: ifmax singular value of
[
rot(s1)
rot(s2)
]
∈ Z256(k+ℓ)×256 is larger than
S , restart
4: ρ ← {0, 1}256
5: A ∼ Rk×ℓq B Sam(ρ)
6: t B As1 + s2
7: t1 := Power2Roundq (t,d)
8: return (pk B (t1, ρ), sk B (ρ, s1, s2, t))
The key generation proceeds exactly as in Dilithium, except we
now check to make sure that the largest singular value of the inte-
ger matrix
[
rot(s1)
rot(s2)
]
∈ Z256(k+ℓ)×256, where rot(·) is defined as in
Section 5.2,is not too large. The cut-off bound is chosen heuristically
so that there is about a 50% chance that random s1, s2 satisfy the
bound. The singular value bound will assure that ∥c(s1, s1)T ∥ will
not be too large.
Algorithm 14 Sign(sk = (ρ, s = (s1, s2)T , t), µ ∈ M)
1: t1 := Power2Roundq (t,d)
2: t0 B t − t1 · 2d
3: r ← {0, 1}256
4: (y1, y2) ∼ Dℓσ × Dkσ B Sam(r )
5: w B Ay1 + y2
6: (w1,w0) := Decomposeq (w,α)
7: c ← H(ρ, t1,w1, µ)
8: z =
[
z1
z2
]
B
[
y1
y2
]
+ c
[
s1
s2
]
9: u ← [0, 1)
10: if u > (1/M) · exp((−2⟨z, cs⟩ + ∥cs∥2)/(2σ 2)) then goto 3
11: z2 B z2 − ct0 −w0
12: if ∥(z1, z2)∥ ≥ B then goto 3
13: h := MakeGHintq (z2,αw1 − z2,α)
14: return Σ B (z1, h, c)
Algorithm 15 Verify(pk = (ρ, t1), µ ∈ M, Σ = (z1, h, c))
1: w1 := UseGHintq (h,Az1 − ct1 · 2d ,α)
2: if c = H (ρ, t1,w1, µ) and ∥(z1,Az1 − ct1 · 2d − αw1)∥ < B and
∥h∥∞ ≤ (q − 1)/2α then
3: return 1
4: else
5: return 0
6: end if
The signing procedure begins by computing t0 in the same man-
ner as in the previous algorithm. The signer then samples y1, y2
from a discrete Gaussian distribution with standard deviation σ
(using an extendable output function Sam expanding a seed r ), com-
putes w = Ay1 + y2 and decomposes it into w = αw1 + w0. The
polynomial c is then computed as in the previous signature scheme,
and zi is computed as yi +csi . The signature z1, z2 is accepted with
probability (1/M) · exp (−2⟨z, cs⟩ + ∥cs∥2/(2σ 2)). In order for this
to be a valid probability, one needs to set the constant M so that
the value should always be less than 1. This constantM is also the
expected number of repetitions that will be needed to output one
signature. The precise relationship between M,σ , and ∥cs∥ was
derived in [37] and we state it in Lemma B.1.
If this rejection sampling step passes, then the distribution of z
is a discrete Gaussian centered at 0. With high probability, the ℓ2
norm of this vector should be tightly concentrated around a value
close to σ ·√(k + ℓ) · 256. Because we perturb this vector (due to the
dropping of the lower order terms of z2 and t), the norm increases
slightly. Experimentally, we set the bound
B2 =
(
1.05 · σ
√
(k + ℓ) · 256
)2
+
(
2d−1 ·
√
60 · 256 · k
)2
, (6)
such that the ℓ2 norm of the vector in Step 12 is almost always less
than B. If this step passes, then the next step of the algorithm uses
z2 and w1 to construct a hint h that allows one to derive w1 from
αw1 − z2 and this hint. The verification procedure also checks that
every coefficient of h is smaller than (q − 1)/2α . We do this check
so that Lemma A.2 can be applied to show strong unforgeability.
Since α is close to the standard deviation σ and each coefficient of
h essentially represents the number of standard deviations z2 was
larger than σ , with very high probability (greater than 1 − 2−128),
the magnitude of each coefficient of h is less than 15, thus this
verification step will always pass for an honest signer.
Concrete parameters. We provide concrete parameters and secu-
rity estimates in Table 2.
B.2 Correctness
First we show that the norm bound check in Step 12 is the same as
in the verification algorithm.
z2 = y2 + cs2 − ct0 −w0 = αw1 +w0 − Ay1 + cs2 − ct0 −w0
= αw1 − Az1 + c(As1 + s2) − ct0 = αw1 − Az1 + ct1 · 2d .
Then we want to show that the first step in the verification
equation produces w1. From the above equality, we know that
αw1 − z2 = Az1 − ct1 · 2d , (7)
and so Lemma A.3 gives us that w1 = UseGHintq (h,Az1 − ct1 ·
2d ,α).
B.3 Zero-Knowledge and Simulation
To prove that Dilithium-G does not leak knowledge of the secret
keys s1, s2, we need to show that the distribution of (z1, z2, c) after
Step 10 is independent of s1, s2. For this, we use the following
lemma which is implicit in the main result of [37].
LemmaB.1. LetT = maxc ∥c(s1, s1)T ∥ andM be a positive integer.
If σ = κT and λ is a positive real number such that eλ/κ+1/(2κ2) ≤ M ,
the statistical distance between (z1, z2, c) and Dℓσ × Dkσ × B60 after
Step 10 is at most 2 exp(−λ2/2) and the expected number of iterations
necessary to output one sample isM .
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Table 2: Parameters for Dilithium-G.
weak medium recommended very high
modulus q 8380417 8380417 8380417 8380417
d (dropped bits in the public key) 11 11 11 11
weight of c 60 60 60 60
max secret singular value S 230 225 210 145
σ ≈ 11 ∗ S ∗ √60 19600 19200 17900 12400
α = (q − 1)/512 16368 16368 16368 16368
(k, ℓ) (2, 2) (3, 3) (4, 4) (5, 5)
η 7 6 5 3
B ≈ as in Eq. (6) 750K 904K 990K 870K
M (and # of repetitions) 3 3 3 3
pk size (bytes) 800 1184 1568 1952
sig size (bytes) 1250 1850 2435 2950
BKZ block-size b to break SIS 210 375 555 780
Best Known Classical bit-cost 61 109 162 228
Best Known Quantum bit-cost 55 99 147 206
Best Plausible bit-cost 43 77 115 161
BKZ block-size b to break LWE 205 345 485 595
Best Known Classical bit-cost 59 100 142 174
Best Known Quantum bit-cost 54 91 129 158
Best Plausible bit-cost 42 71 101 124
To see how this lemma is used for setting our parameters, we
will use as an example the “recommended” set of parameters from
Table 2. The secret key (s1, s2) is generated at random with each
coefficient uniformly distributed between −5 and 5 until the max-
imum singular value of
[
rot(s1)
rot(s2)
]
∈ Z256(k+ℓ)×256 is less than 210.
This implies that the T in Lemma B.1 is 210 · √60 ≈ 1626. If we, for
example, set σ = 11T and λ = 12, then we obtain that the statistical
distance is approximately e−72 and eλ/κ+1(2κ2) < 3. So we can set
M = 3.
To simulate a signature, we sample (z1, z2, c) ← Dℓσ ×Dkσ × B60,
then computew := Az1 + z2 −ct. Once we havew, we can compute
the hint h. We then program c := H(ρ, t1,w1, µ). Unless the value
for H(ρ, t1,w1, µ) has already been set, the programming step is
valid and our simulation is complete. If H(ρ, t1,w1, µ) has been
previously assigned a value, then it must be that
HighBitsq (Az1 + z2 − ct,α) = w1.
Since the codomain of the above equation, as a function of z1, z2, is
extremely large (greater than 24000 for all the parameters in Table
2), if HighBitsq (Az1 + z2 − ct,α) hits an already existing value,
it implies that Az1 + z2 is not uniformly-distributed in Rkq when
(z1, z2) ← Dℓσ × Dkσ . Using the search-to-decision reduction for
Module-LWE [35] (which is applicable because our σ is sufficiently
high) it implies that the search Module-LWE problem is hard. 8
Thus we can assume that the programming of H is always valid.
8The σ is so high that, with a little technical analysis, it should be possible to prove
that Az1 + z2 is indeed statistically-close to uniform.
B.4 Security Proof
Throughout the proof we will make the assumption (which is fa-
vorable to the adversary) that he gets t = As1 + s2 as the public
key. In the real scheme, he only gets the higher order bits of t. In
practice, therefore, the scheme may be even more difficult for the
adversary to break.
Lemma B.2. Forging a signature implies finding u1, u2,u3 such
that ∥u1, u2∥ ≤ 2B and ∥u3∥∞ ≤ 2 such that Au1 + u2 = u3t1 · 2d
and (u1, u2,u3) , 0.
Proof. The public key is set to be (A, t). Signature queries by
the adversary are created via the procedure described in Section 4.3.
We now describe our extractor when the Adversary produces a
winning query. If the Adversary creates a signature (z1, h, c) for a
message µ, then he must have queried
H(ρ, t1,w1, µ) = c, (8)
where w1 = UseGHintq (h,Az1 − t1c · 2d ,α), either directly by
querying H or indirectly during a signing query.
Case 1: If c was queried during a signing query, then the reduction
already knows another (z′1, h′, c) (and the associated w′1) for a mes-
sage µ ′ such that H(ρ, t1,w′1, µ ′) = c = H(ρ, t1,w1, µ). This implies
that µ = µ ′ and w1 = w′1, or else we found a second pre-image for
c . Since w1 = w′1, it must be that{
UseGHintq (h,Az1 − t1c · 2d ,α) = w1
UseGHintq (h′,Az′1 − t1c · 2d ,α) = w1
.
If z1 = z′1, then Lemma A.3 states that we must have h = h
′, and so
the adversary has not found a new signature. Thus it must be that
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z1 , z′1. If we define{
u = Az1 − t1c · 2d −w1 · α
u′ = Az′1 − t1c · 2d −w1 · α
,
then subtracting we obtain
A(z1 − z′1) − (u − u′) = 0.
From the verification equation, we know that ∥(z1, u)∥ ≤ B and
∥(z′1, u′)∥ ≤ B, and therefore ∥(z1 − z′1, u − u′)∥ ≤ 2B.
Case 2: We now handle the case where the query in Eq. (8) was
done directly to H. A standard forking lemma argument shows
that the reduction can then extract two signatures (z1, h, c) and
(z′1, h′, c ′) for c , c ′ such that{
UseGHintq (h,Az1 − t1c · 2d ,α) = w1
UseGHintq (h′,Az′1 − t1c ′ · 2d ,α) = w1
.
If we define {
u = Az1 − t1c · 2d −w1 · α
u′ = Az′1 − t1c ′ · 2d −w1 · α
,
then subtracting we obtain
A(z1 − z′1) − (u − u′) = t1 · 2d · (c − c ′).
From the verification equation, we know that ∥(z1, u)∥ ≤ B and
∥(z′1, u′)∥ ≤ B, and therefore ∥(z1 − z′1, u − u′)∥ ≤ 2B. 
B.5 Representing Gaussians
The output of the signature scheme (Algorithm 14) is a polynomial
vector z1 each of whose coefficients is distributed as a discrete
Gaussian over Z with standard deviation σ , and a “hint” vector
h consisting of “carry” bits when adding a discrete Gaussian to a
uniformly-distributed element in Zq . In both cases, the integers
are distributed according to probability distributions that are more
weighted towards elements with small norms, and therefore it is
not optimal to simply represent integers with their binary represen-
tations. The optimal representation would be via Huffman encoding
(as in [25]), and what we propose is essentially a simplified version
that is nearly optimal.
In the case of coefficients of z1, we write each coefficient
z mod± q = z1 · 2δ + z0
where z0 = z mod± q. Since the expected absolute value of z is
approximately σ , when 2δ is also approximately σ , then the value
of z0 is close to being uniform between −2δ−1 and 2δ−1. The dis-
tribution of z1, however, has tails that decrease very fast. A simple
and close to optimal representation of z is therefore to send z0
uncompressed (which requires δ bits) and then encode z1 using the
prefix-free encoding of Table 3.
When σ = 2δ , the above compression requires on average ap-
proximately 2.25 bits to represent each coefficient of z1. Thus the
total representation of z is on average δ + 2.25 bits.
The coefficients of h have a very similar distribution to the coef-
ficients z1 when α ≈ σ . Therefore we can use the same encoding
for this vector as well. To get a rough approximation of the num-
ber of bits required to represent the signature (z1, h, c) is therefore
(2.25 + δ ) · 256 · ℓ + 2.5 · 256 · k + 256. The exact number will differ
because we do not necessarily take the value of σ which is equal to
Table 3: Prefix-free Encoding for the high-order integers of
the coefficients of z1 and for the coefficients of h.
Integer Representation Bits
0 00 2
1 01 2
−1 10 2
k (≥ 2) 1102k−41 2k − 1
−k (≤ −2) 1102k−31 2k
α and 2δ . The signature sizes in Table 2 represent upper bounds
that are exceeded less than 1% of the time in practice. If one would
like to have a strict limit on the signature size, then the signer could
check to make sure that the signature has length less than this
bound before outputting the signature. If the length is greater, then
the signer can simply restart the procedure anew.
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